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This paper offers a systematic analysis of Poincaré’s understanding of beauty in 
science. In particular, the paper examines the epistemic significance Poincaré 
attributes to aesthetic judgement by reconstructing and analysing his arguments 
on simplicity and unity in science. I offer a consistent reconstruction of 
Poincaré’s account and show that for Poincaré simplicity and unity are 
regulative principles, linked to the aim of science – that of achieving 
understanding of how phenomena relate. I show how Poincaré’s account of 





This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of Poincaré’s understanding of 
beauty in science and, in particular, his epistemic justification of simplicity and 
unity in science. I reconstruct Poincaré’s account and show that for Poincaré 
simplicity and unity are regulative principles, linked to the aim of science - that 
of achieving understanding of how the phenomena relate. I investigate the 
epistemic significance Poincaré attributes to aesthetic considerations and argue 
that rather than linking beauty to truth, Poincaré links beauty to scientific 
understanding. In conclusion, I show how this account offers new insights into 
Poincaré’s wider philosophy of science, particularly regarding the aim of 
science and scientific knowledge.  
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 The structure of this paper is as follows. I start with a discussion of the 
beauty in science and offer an analysis of Poincaré’s views on the role beauty 
plays in scientific practice. I argue that for Poincaré beauty reduces to simplicity 
and unity. In section three I investigate Poincaré’s understanding of simplicity as 
an aesthetic property of theories. I argue that while simplicity plays a 
methodological role, Poincaré does not take simplicity to be linked to the 
truthlikeness of theories exemplifying it. Section four analyses the role of unity 
in science. I argue that Poincaré takes unity to be the ultimate goal of science 
which gives us understanding. In section five I explore how utility is linked to 
aesthetic judgement, Poincaré’s account of creativity, and show the role of the 
aesthetic sensibility in selecting useful theories. I then explore the implications 
of this theory of aesthetics in science for Poincaré’s overall philosophy of 
science and in particular his alleged realism about scientific theories. Section six 
is the conclusion.  
 
2. Beauty in Science 
 
Aesthetic judgements are an integral part of scientific practice. Scientists employ 
aesthetic judgements in the selection of phenomena to study, the construction 
of hypotheses, the evaluation of theories and in deciding their epistemic 
commitments towards a theory. Paul Dirac famously attributed to beauty a 
special epistemic role, claiming that “one has a great confidence in the theory 
arising from its great beauty, quite independent of its detailed successes” (Dirac 
1980, 40). Dirac believes beauty is linked to truthlikeness and we can be 
confident in the truth of a beautiful theory independently of the data. Dirac 
claims that “[o]ne has an overpowering belief that [the theory’s] foundations 
must be correct quite independent of its agreement with observation” (ibid.). 
Werner Heisenberg also claimed to believe in this intrinsic relationship between 
truth and beauty: “[i]f nature leads us to mathematical forms of great simplicity 
and beauty we cannot help thinking that they are “true”, that they reveal a 
genuine feature of nature” (Heisenberg 1971, 68). James Watson claims that 
what convinced Rosalind Franklin, who had already considered the double 
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helix structure of DNA but believed some of the x-ray pictures she had 
produced gave evidence against it, was the fact that the double helix structure 
of DNA “was too pretty not to be true” (1968, 124).  
 Before we examine Poincaré’s account of aesthetic considerations in 
science, it is worth starting with some central questions concerning the concept 
of beauty in particular. The first question, naturally, regards what beauty is: 
whether it is a reducible or irreducible property. Practising scientists often 
attribute properties of ‘harmony’, ‘symmetry’, ‘simplicity’ and ‘unity’ to theories 
they regard as beautiful, implying that beauty is reducible to a set of properties.1 
As I will show in this section, Poincaré offers such a reductivist account of 
beauty, taking beauty to reduce to simplicity and unity. This leads us to the 
second question that needs to be addressed:  where do we find beauty? Beauty 
is attributed to a wide range of subjects: to phenomena, scientific theories, 
mathematical proofs, visual representations, scientific models, etc.. Poincaré 
himself attributed beauty to scientific hypotheses and theories as well as 
mathematical axioms and theories. The focus of this paper will be primarily on 
his arguments for the aesthetic value of scientific hypotheses and theories.  
A third question that deserves attention is what function beauty plays in 
scientific practice. Here we can find several different stances – beauty can play 
a motivational role in scientific practise, it can be used as a heuristic guide or it 
can be regarded as a truth indicator. Poincaré himself believes that beauty gives 
us motivation to study nature (1908, 368). He also believes, like his 
contemporaries Pierre Duhem (1954) and Ernst Mach (1984), that aesthetic 
considerations can be heuristic guides in the resolution of theory choice. That 
is, if faced with two alternative theories that equally well fit the phenomena, 
one should choose the most aesthetically pleasing one. As we saw in the case of 
Dirac and Heisenberg, however, it is often believed that aesthetic 
considerations have a more fundamental, epistemic, role. According to this 
view, there is a special epistemic link between the aesthetic properties of a 																																																								
1 It is interesting to consider whether these particular properties are sought after 
in all scientific disciplines or whether they are particularly valued in physics and 
the mathematical sciences.   
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theory and its truth and we should believe in a theory’s truthlikeness if the 
theory possesses aesthetic properties. I later illustrate that for Poincaré such a 
link cannot be justified.  
A fourth important question concerns whether beauty is an objective 
property or is projected upon theories by us. Objectivist accounts take there to 
be an objective property we discover in the theories or the phenomena, while 
projectivist accounts claim that aesthetic judgements are simply subjective 
responses to certain properties of theories. In section 5 I argue that Poincaré 
takes an intermediate position.  
 The fifth and final question concerns the relationship between aesthetic 
value and empirical adequacy. According to James McAllister (1996), one can 
take aesthetic value to be independent from empirical adequacy or simply an 
aspect of it. According to the ‘autonomist’ view, empirical success and aesthetic 
value are independent of each other, allowing the latter to act as an indicator of 
the former. On the opposing account, there is nothing more to aesthetic 
appreciation of a theory than the appreciation that the theory is empirically 
successful.2 As will become clear in the next sections, Poincaré aligns with the 
former thesis.  
Before we can address these questions in further detail, we need to 
understand exactly in what context Poincaré employs the concept of beauty and 
whether beauty is analysed into other aesthetic properties. In the remainder of 
this section I focus on Poincaré’s argument about the value of science and the 
motivational role of beauty and further show that for him beauty can be 
analysed into two properties we find in theories and the phenomena: simplicity 
and unity.  
Poincaré develops an argument for the motivational role of beauty in 
science in the context of the value of science. The question whether science is 
valuable in itself or for its practical utility has long been at the forefront of 
political and social debate. The beginning of the 20th century is not an 																																																								
2 There is also a debate concerning whether aesthetic judgements are indeed 
aesthetic. Todd (2008) argues that aesthetic judgements are epistemic because 
they are associated with normative claims. 
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exception; the so called ‘bankruptcy of science’ fuelled enormous debates in 
France where scientists tried to defend the value of science despite its 
discontinuities and breaks from past advancements. Poincaré develops an 
argument in which he defends the continuity of science against the apparent 
‘revolutions’ and discontinuities. It is during these debates that he tackles the 
question about the value of science.   
Science can be valuable either in itself or for its products. Both in the The 
Value of Science and Science and Method Poincaré discusses Tolstoi’s claim 
that ‘science for its own sake’ is an absurd idea: since time and resources are 
limited, we have to make choices with regard to which questions to explore; 
this choice is necessarily guided by utility. However, utility for Tolstoi is 
understood in terms of moral progress (Poincaré 1908, 363). Poincaré claims 
that while science cannot be done for its own sake due to practical constraints, 
science cannot be pursued for its products only, ‘in view of an immediate 
application’. It is here that he brings the idea of aesthetic emotion: "[t]he 
scientist does not study nature because it is useful to do so. He studies it 
because he takes pleasure in it, and he takes pleasure in it because it is 
beautiful" (ibid., 368). Poincaré clarifies how he understands this concept of 
beauty:  
 
I am not speaking, of course, of the beauty which strikes the senses, of 
the beauty of qualities and appearances. I am far from despising this, but 
it has nothing to do with science. What I mean is that more intimate 
beauty which comes from the harmonious order of its parts, and which 
pure intelligence can grasp” (ibid.).  
 
According to Poincaré the aim of science is to offer understanding of the 
underlying relations between phenomena. He argues that scientific theories 
offer “a classification, a manner of bringing together facts which appearances 
separate, though they were bound together by some natural and hidden 
kinship” (ibid., 347). It is in this underlying harmony or unity that our theories 
uncover that we find beauty.  
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Beauty, for Poincaré, is an aesthetic property that reduces to the 
simplicity and unity of our theories and we can have intellectual access to it: 
“every generalisation supposes in a certain measure a belief in the unity and 
simplicity of nature” (Poincaré 1902, 112). He furthermore states that: “[i]t is 
because simplicity and vastness are both beautiful that we seek by preference 
simple facts and vast facts” (ibid., 368). It is thus necessary for us to examine in 
further details his account of simplicity and unity.  
This section started with five questions regarding the notion of beauty 
and how Poincaré develops this notion. We have seen that Poincaré develops a 
reductionist notion of beauty by analysing beauty as the unity and simplicity of 
scientific hypotheses and theories. Before analysing further the epistemic role 
for beauty, it is important to examine how Poincaré understands the notions of 
simplicity and unity. The next section presents Poincaré’s arguments on the role 
of simplicity. 
 
3. Simplicity  
 
There are three issues regarding simplicity that I want to address in this section: 
(1) how simplicity is defined; (2) how it is used; and (3) how it is justified. The 
first issue is conceptual and concerns which understanding of simplicity 
Poincaré employs. Simplicity can be ontological (often referred to in the 
contemporary literature as parsimony), or syntactic (often referred to as 
elegance). Parsimony refers to the number and complexity of things a theory 
postulates. Parsimony, for example, was a driving consideration in the 
overthrowing of phlogiston theory, since the alternative theory developed by 
Lavoisier claimed equal explanatory power without adding an additional 
substance. Elegance, on the other hand, does not refer to the ‘kinds’ a theory 
postulates, but to the number of hypotheses and axioms of the theory. Syntactic 
elegance or simplicity can also be understood as the lack of complexity, ad 
hocness, or free parameters in a theory.     
Poincaré uses simplicity mainly to denote syntactic elegance. However, 
he also stresses the importance of simplicity in the ontological sense. Despite 
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claiming that questions about ontology should be left to the metaphysicians, he 
allows one to postulate unobservable entities in one’s theory if these offer useful 
fictional devices for prediction. When discussing the usefulness of the ether, he 
claims that: 
 
The object of mathematical theories is not to reveal to us the real nature of 
things; that would be an unreasonable claim. Their only object is to 
coordinate the physical laws with which physical experiment makes us 
acquainted. […] Whether the ether exists or not matters little—let us leave 
that to the metaphysicians; what is essential for us is, that everything 
happens as if it existed, and that this hypothesis is found to be suitable for 
the explanation of phenomena. […] [S]ome day, no doubt, the ether will be 
thrown aside as useless (Poincaré 1902, 156). 
  
This quotation shows us that while Poincaré is not interested in addressing 
ontological questions, he allows the endorsement of an unobservable entity if it 
is useful for making predictions. Thus, the endorsement of an unobservable 
entity is only legitimate if it leads to an empirically successful theory that saves 
the phenomena.3  
The second issue concerning simplicity is its role in scientific enquiry. 
We can understand simplicity as playing either an epistemic role or a purely 
heuristic role. One can take simplicity to be an indicator of truth and regard 
simpler theories to be closer to the truth than complex ones. Alternatively, one 
can take simplicity to play a merely heuristic role that allows one to rationally 
employ a simple theory for some end.  
Poincaré argues for the instrumental role of simplicity. Simplicity is a 
guiding rule in a number of contexts, e.g. in the selection of facts when making 
generalisations and in evaluating and comparing competing hypotheses and 
theories. Aesthetic values guide our choice in the construction and selection of 																																																								
3 Poincaré’s argument here is an instance of non-eliminative instrumentalism. Mach 
(1984), on the other hand, endorses an eliminative instrumentalism, arguing that “all 
metaphysical elements are to be eliminated as superfluous and as destructive of the 
economy of science” (Mach 1984 xxxviii). 
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hypotheses: “every proposition may be generalised in an infinite number of 
ways. Among all the possible generalisations we must choose, and we cannot 
but choose the simplest” (ibid., 99). When it comes to understanding whether 
simplicity is an objective property of facts, he answers in the negative. 
Simplicity is a guide to more useful theories:  
 
Are there such things as simple facts? And if there are, how are we to 
recognise them? Who can tell that what we believe to be simple does not 
conceal an alarming complexity? All we can say is that we must prefer 
facts which appear simple (1908, 365). 
 
Whilst recognising the heuristic role of simplicity, Poincaré does not 
believe we can infer that simple laws reflect reality, that nature in itself is 
simple. Poincaré considers simplicity to be playing a very important regulative 
role in the advancement of science, but does not believe we should be drawing 
metaphysical conclusions from its role. This point is evident in his defence of 
Euclidean geometry. Poincaré famously discusses the empirical equivalence 
between a world with a Euclidean geometry and a world with a non-Euclidean 
geometry and compensatory distorting forces, and claims that our preference 
ought to be led by considerations of simplicity. He defends the use of Euclidean 
geometry as the simplest option because it is the most convenient (1902, 45). 
He explicitly takes this choice, led by simplicity, to be the most convenient and 
useful one but not to be the true one. 
Poincaré argues that the history of science places doubt on the claim that 
nature itself is simple (ibid., 99-100). He argues that we cannot infer from the 
usefulness of simplicity that the world itself is simple. Simplicity should not be 
taken to be a guide to the true nature of reality. For Poincaré simplicity is a 
condition of our making: “We are therefore led to adopt the same course as if a 
simple law, other things being equal, is more probable than a complex law” 
(ibid., 100). Poincaré claims that while it could appear that simple laws govern 
reality, the history of science indicates that the phenomena are complex and 
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simplicity is sometimes only apparent. A closer exploration of the phenomena 
reveals deep complexity in nature:  
 
A century ago it was frankly confessed and proclaimed that nature loves 
simplicity; but nature has proved the contrary since then on more than 
one occasion. We no longer confess this tendency, and we only keep of 
it what is indispensable, so that science may not become impossible” 
(ibid., 100).  
 
Poincaré famously uses the atomic theory to show that what was 
supposed to be a simple explanation of the phenomena turned into a complex 
one. He claims that while the atom was initially regarded as the fundamental 
building block of reality, it is full of complexity: “this atom is a world” (Poincaré 
1913, 91).  
Poincaré argues that even though we cannot know whether simplicity is 
a property of nature, it has to be a property of our theories and we should 
always try to generalise in the simplest possible way:  
 
[T]hose who do not believe that natural laws must be simple are still often 
obliged to act as if they did believe it. They cannot entirely dispense with 
the necessity without making all generalisations, and therefore all science, 
impossible. It is clear that every law can be generalised in a number of 
ways, and it is a question of choice. The choice can only be guided by 
considerations of simplicity [….] [E]very law is held to be simple until the 
contrary is proved (1902, 113).  
 
Importantly, Poincaré argues that simplicity is a necessity of our making, a 
requirement from which we cannot free ourselves: “In formulating a general, 
simple, and formal law, based on a comparatively small number of not 
altogether consistent experiments, we have only obeyed a necessity from which 
the human mind cannot free itself” (ibid., 100).   
	 10	
This section started with three issues regarding Poincaré’s understanding of 
simplicity: how simplicity is defined, used and justified. Regarding the first 
issue, we have established that Poincaré is mainly concerned with the 
mathematical elegance of scientific theories. It is the elegance of theories that is 
likely to strike the observer as beautiful. When it comes to the second issue – 
 applicability of simplicity –, Poincaré takes simplicity to play a regulative role 
but is sceptical that we can make inferences about the world in itself. Simplicity 
does not lead us to true theories; rather, it aids the development of hypotheses, 
our choice of hypotheses, and ultimately guides our choice between theories 
that equally fit the data. The third issue concerns whether Poincaré offers any 
justification for simplicity. Poincaré takes simplicity to play a regulative role in 
that it promotes the development of useful theories that offer understanding of 
relations in the phenomena. While simplicity cannot be taken to be an indicator 
of a theory’s truth, it plays an important epistemic role. In the next section I 
show that, for Poincaré, both simplicity and unity are regulative ideals linked to 




So far I have argued that beauty for Poincaré is to be found in the simplicity and 
unity of scientific theories. We established that while simplicity plays a 
regulative role, it does not lead us to rationally believe in the ontology of a 
theory. Rather it justifies the use of a theory. Simplicity plays an instrumental 
role, but Poincaré is careful to note that he is not concerned with whether 
nature itself is simple or not. He notes that one might doubt the simplicity of 
nature by considering the history of science and the fate of past simple theories. 
However, the principle of simplicity and unity need to be followed as regulative 
ideals regardless of whether nature itself is simple or unified. The most 
intriguing part of Poincaré’s argument concerns the relationship between 
simplicity and unity. In this section I show that unity is also taken to be a 
regulative ideal linked to the aim of science, that of understanding how the 
phenomena relate. 
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Unification is often appealed to by physicists when describing a theory 
as beautiful. Heisenberg, for example, claims that “[b]eauty is the proper 
conformity of the parts to one another and to the whole [….] The mathematical 
relation can therefore assemble two initially independent parts into a whole, 
and so produce beauty” (Heisenberg 1974, 174). He explains that theories like 
Newtonian mechanics greatly exemplify this – they are able to account for and 
connect a great variety of mechanical phenomena under a simple system of 
axioms. Richard Feynman claims that beauty stems from our understanding of 
how different elements fit into a greater whole. He argues that for a physicist 
beauty is felt when one can grasp the ‘pattern’ of nature; when one can 
appreciate how “two laws are connected so that reasoning alone will bring you 
from one to the other ... you will appreciate the beauty of the relationship of the 
statements” (Feynman, 1967, p. 41).  
There are many cases in the history of science in which the unificatory 
power of a theory has been considered epistemically significant. Newton 
unified celestial and terrestrial phenomena under the theory of gravitation. 
Maxwell unified electric and magnetic phenomena with his theory of 
electromagnetism. Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity achieved 
many levels of unification: unification of space and time into spacetime, the 
equivalence of mass and energy (E=mc2), the equivalence of inertia and gravity, 
and finally, gravity is explained as a consequence of the variable curvature of 
spacetime. Unity is also often taken to be the ultimate goal of science with 
contemporary physics looking for a unification of all four fundamental forces 
(gravity, weak, strong, and electromagnetic) into a ‘theory of everything’.   
 Like many contemporary scientists, Poincaré takes the aim of science to 
be the development of a unified theory that uncovers ‘hidden relations’ or 
‘hidden kinships’ between the phenomena. For Poincaré it is through grasping 
the harmony between the phenomena that we achieve understanding of the 
nature of reality. He argues that it is not coincidental that we search for 
harmony in nature: “[w]e take elements which at the first glance are 
unconnected; these arrange themselves in an unexpected order, and form a 
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harmonious whole. We cannot believe that this unexpected harmony is a mere 
result of chance” (1902, 100).4  
However, the unity of theories cannot be understood in either objectivist 
or projectivist terms. Unity is not an objective feature of the world outside our 
mental capacities; nor is it a subjective feature we project upon nature. Poincaré 
argues that unity is part and parcel of our intellectual capacities and an ideal we 
follow in our enquiries. Poincaré positions himself between an objectivist and 
subjectivist stance towards aesthetic judgement and takes aesthetic judgements 
to bear intersubjective validity. Aesthetic judgements are not simply emotional 
responses, differing between individuals with different tastes and preferences. 
Nor are they objective, since they do not refer to or reflect an objective property 
of a theory. It is reasonable to suppose that for Poincaré aesthetic judgements 
are objective in that there is intersubjective agreement between beings like us 
who share the same intellectual capacities. 5  Poincaré claims that “[t]his 
harmony is at once a satisfaction of our aesthetic requirements, and an 
assistance to the mind which it supports and guides” (1908, 396-397).6 
 When further assessing whether we can infer the simplicity and unity of 
nature from the usefulness of these two aesthetic properties, Poincaré argues: 
 																																																								
4 Note here that Poincaré uses ‘harmony’ and ‘unity’ both as properties of theories and 
of the phenomena, and that he takes harmony to reduce to unity.  
5 While there is no explicit reference to Kant’s aesthetic theory in Poincaré’s writing, a 
middle position between objectivism and subjectivism would imply a Kantian 
influence here.  According to Kant, aesthetic judgements depend on the subject’s 
reflection on the object rather than in some property in the object itself. However, Kant 
claims that rather than being completely subjective emotional responses, aesthetic 
judgements demand the agreement of others and thus have intersubjective validity 
(Kant 2000). 
6 Note the parallels and differences here with Poincaré’s contemporary Pierre Duhem. 
While Duhem argues that aesthetic values such as ‘simplicity’ and ‘elegance’ “are 
essentially subjective, contingent, and variable with time, with schools, and with 
persons” (Duhem 1954 , 288), there is still a need to explain how scientists come to an 
agreement about the aesthetic properties of theories. Just like David Hume, Duhem 
appeals to the concept of ‘good sense’, which an impartial scientist possesses. Duhem 
argues that scientists who have good sense can appreciate the aesthetic properties of 
theories because they are unbiased and objective. It is good sense that ensures that 
despite the subjective nature of aesthetic judgment, scientists with good sense can 
come to an objective agreement about the aesthetic properties of theories (see Stump 
(2007) and Ivanova (2010)).  
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Every generalisation supposes in a certain measure a belief in the unity 
and simplicity of nature.[7] As far as unity is concerned, there can be no 
difficulty. If the different parts of the universe were not as the organs of 
the same body, they would not react the one upon the other; they would 
mutually ignore each other, and we in particular should only know one 
part. We need not, therefore, ask if nature is one, but how she is one. As 
for the second point, that is not so clear. It is not certain that nature is 
simple. (ibid., 112) 
 
The following passages show that while acting as regulative ideals, Poincaré 
does not take simplicity and unity to be linked to truthlikeness.  In Science and 
Method he claims that “we may dream of a harmonious world, but how far will 
it fall short of the real world?” (1908, 369). Similarly, simple theories often end 
up revealing deep complexities in the phenomena; he does not take it to be 
plausible to ask whether nature itself is simple and unified. We presuppose 
unity and simplicity as regulative ideals. Both simplicity and unity are linked to 
the goal of science; they are ideals to be followed in the search for the 
understanding of nature.  
Unity is a guiding principle in the selection and evaluation of scientific 
hypotheses: “[i]t is, then, the search for this special beauty, the sense of the 
harmony of the world, that makes us select the facts best suited to contribute to 
this harmony; just as the artist selects those features of his sitter which complete 
the portrait and give it character and life” (368).8 For Poincaré, beauty is to be 
found in the harmony our theories reveal. It is to be found in the hidden 
relations that our theories uncover and in their unification of apparently 
disconnected phenomena. It is this harmony that Poincaré takes to give us 
understanding.   
With these elements of Poincaré’s argument in place, we can finally 
address the question of justification posed in the previous section: how are 																																																								
7 ‘Nature’ is to be understood here as the objects of our experience. 
8  Morrison (2008) investigates the relationship between the unification project in 
contemporary physics and Kant’s account of unification in the sciences.  
	 14	
simplicity and unity to be justified as aesthetic principles that guide scientific 
enquiry? I have argued that Poincaré justifies the use of simplicity and unity 
because they are linked to the goal of science – the acquisition of 
understanding. It is in revealing ‘hidden kinships’ and ‘real relations’ in the 
phenomena that Poincaré finds the aim of science accomplished and our 
understanding of nature fulfilled. As a consequence, Poincaré’s account of 
aesthetic judgement in science is complex and sophisticated, offering new ways 
to think about aesthetics judgement in science. By reducing aesthetic 
judgements to judgements about the unity and simplicity of scientific theories, 
Poincaré offers an interesting reductivist account of aesthetic properties. In the 
next section I defend Poincaré’s account by showing (a) the relationship 
between the aesthetic sensibility and utility, and (b) how these ideas fit his 




Having established a coherent reading of Poincaré’s account of aesthetics of 
science, I want to further explore the implications of this account and its fit with 
Poincaré’s overall philosophy of science. An interesting point worth addressing 
regards Poincaré’s claims about aesthetic judgement and its link to utility. 
Poincaré explicitly highlights this link when stating that theories that can be 
regarded as an ‘economy of thought’ tend to be more useful: 
 
Thus we see that care for the beautiful leads us to the same selection as care 
for the useful. Similarly economy of thought, that economy of effort which, 
according to Mach, is the constant tendency of science, is a source of 
beauty as well as a practical advantage (Poincaré 1908, 369).  
 
But how exactly does Poincaré articulate this link between utility and aesthetic 
judgement?  
An interesting place to draw some insights and connections is Poincaré’s 
discussion of beauty in mathematics and the role of the aesthetic sensibility in 
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selecting mathematical axioms and proofs. When discussing the case of 
creativity and mathematical discovery, Poincaré develops an account of 
creativity that gives central role to the aesthetic judgement of the mathematician 
which is explicitly linked to utility. According to his account, the creative 
process consists of four distinct but interconnected psychological phases: 
preparation; incubation; insight; and revision.9 During the preparation process 
the thinker consciously studies the problem at hand and prepares for the 
incubation process. During the incubation process the mind is unconsciously 
working on the problem. It is during incubation that the mind has these ‘sudden 
illuminations’. Incubation is necessarily preceded and followed by periods of 
conscious work, which ensures that the search for a solution is not too wide, 
open and unfruitful. Incubation, however, does not imply that the mind is not 
hard at work in trying to solve a problem; it only implies that this process is 
unconscious. During this period, Poincaré claims that the ‘unconscious 
machine’ is at work. Critical conscious reflection is vital in the period after the 
inspiration in order for the ideas to be evaluated and verified. As Livingston 
(2009) argues, Poincaré’s account of creativity significantly differs from 
contemporary inspirationalist accounts of creativity, according to which the 
creative process is an unconscious activity of the mind. Poincaré’s account 
offers a more complex understanding of creativity as a product of both 
conscious and unconscious processes. 
An important aspect of Poincaré’s account of creativity concerns how the 
mind becomes conscious of the creative ideas it has conceived during 
incubation. Poincaré argues that the useful mathematical ideas are the ones that 
trigger the mathematician’s aesthetic sensibility. It is in this context that he 
appeals to mathematical elegance, simplicity and harmony that pure 
intelligence can grasp. Elegance and harmony give rise to an aesthetic emotion: 
“[t]his harmony is at once a satisfaction of our aesthetic requirements, and an 
assistance to the mind which it supports and guides” (1908, 396-397). The 
aesthetic sensibility “plays the part of the delicate sieve” which checks the result 
blindly generated by the mind and selects only the most elegant and beautiful 																																																								
9 For a detailed discussion of Poincaré’s account of creativity, see Livingston (2009). 
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combinations produced (ibid., 397). We therefore see that for Poincaré the 
aesthetic sensibility can select the theories or proofs that best suit our aesthetic 
requirements. But he makes the further claim, that “[t]he useful combinations 
are precisely the most beautiful” (ibid.).  
The link between practical utility and beauty raises the question whether 
the search for beauty is in any sense linked also to the acquisition of truth. As I 
noted in section 2, traditionally objectivist accounts claim that aesthetic 
judgements reflect objective properties of theories, and furthermore, that there is 
an epistemic link between a theory’s aesthetic properties and its truthlikeness. 
Does Poincaré attribute to beauty such an epistemic link to truth? That is, does 
he regard the beauty of a theory as an indicator of its truth. At first sight it is 
difficult to attribute such a position to Poincaré. Traditionally he has been 
associated with a conventionalist or instrumentalist view of science, claiming 
that the aim of science is not truth but empirical adequacy. More recently, 
philosophers have claimed that his position is best understood as a form of 
selective realism, namely structural realism. John Worrall (1989), for example, 
claims that while Poincaré remains agnostic about unobservable entities, he is a 
realist about relations in the unobservable world discovered by our best 
scientific theories. Worrall argues that by giving up realism about unobservable 
entities such as atoms and electrons, Poincaré can account for the 
discontinuities in science by arguing that the revisions occurring in scientific 
revolutions concern ontological questions. 10  The relations between 
unobservables, however, remain unchanged. It is claims about ‘structural’ or 
‘relational’ knowledge and clear opposition to ontological commitments that 
has convinced Worrall, Gower (2000) and Zahar (2001) that Poincaré’s realism 
is structural.11 These readings have explicitly noted that for Poincaré the aim of 																																																								
10 While opposing the atomic hypothesis for the majority of his life, Poincaré accepted 
the atom in 1912 claiming that there is sufficient experimental evidence for its 
existence. He draws (1913) an important distinction between the ‘metaphysical’ atom, 
which is supposed to be indivisible and unifying, and ‘the atom of the chemist’, for 
which there is sufficient evidence but which has proven to lead to more complexity. 
For more details on Poincaré’s argument, see Stump (1989) and Ivanova (2013). 
11 According to structural realism, we can know the relations between unobservable 
entities, but not their properties (their nature). We can differentiate three mutually 
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science is not truth but empirically adequate theories that at the ideal end of 
science could offer knowledge of underlying relations.12  
This reading sheds light on the idea that for Poincaré science cannot offer 
us the true underlying nature of reality and can at best give us relational 
knowledge – knowledge of how the phenomena are related. However, we can 
doubt even the idea that Poincaré is a structural realist. Poincaré claims on 
many occasions that we cannot reach the real nature of reality; that we only 
deal with appearances and our aim is to understand how the phenomena relate. 
His position has a neo-Kantian twist13 that seems to challenge a structural realist 
reading of his position. He claims that we cannot discover a mind-independent 
reality, whether it is unobservable entities or unobservable relations, and that 
the phenomena we use for the construction of our theories are constructed by 
us.    
 
Does the harmony the human intelligence thinks it discovers in nature 
exist outside of this intelligence? No, beyond all doubt, a reality 
completely independent of the mind which conceives it, sees it or feels it, 
is an impossibility. A world as exterior as that, even if it existed, would for 
us be forever inaccessible. But what we call objective reality is, in the last 
analysis, what is common to many thinking beings, and could be common 																																																																																																																																																														
exclusive views regarding unobservable entities, which structural realists can endorse. 
A structural realist can be (1) agnostic as to whether there are unobservable entities. Or, 
(2) she can hold that there are unobservable entities, but our epistemic restriction does 
not allow us to know their 'nature' (that is, their first order properties). Or (3) a 
structural realist can employ the argument for coherence between epistemology and 
metaphysics and suggest that since all we can know is relations and not the entities 
themselves, then we should eliminate the unobservable entities from our ontology. This 
version is compatible with Ladyman's (1998) ontic structural realism. 
12  Ivanova (2015) has recently defined several different meanings of the term 
conventionalism associated with Poincaré’s position and related it to his structuralism 
and neo-Kantianism.  
13 While Poincaré continued endorsing the synthetic a priori, he ‘corrected’ the Kantian 
framework in light of the existence of non-Euclidean geometries by claiming that they 
have conventional and not synthetic a priori status. Ben-Menahem (2006) gives a 
detailed account of Poincaré’s conventionalism, while Friedman (1999) explains the 
neo-Kantian elements in Poincaré’s epistemology. What concerns me here are the 
similarities between Poincaré’s and Kant’s theories of aesthetic judgement, that have 
not yet been noted in the literature.  
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to all; this common part, we shall see, can only be the harmony expressed 
by mathematical laws. It is this harmony then which is the sole objective 
reality, the only truth we can attain. (ibid.,14) 
 
Scientific realists, including structural realists, are explicitly committed to the 
claim that our best scientific theories can discover a mind-independent structure 
of the world.14 They are also often committed to the claim that super-empirical 
aesthetic criteria are guides to the truth. That is, it is often taken to be the case 
that beauty and truth stand in a special epistemic relationship. This relationship 
justifies our belief in the truth of a theory. In this section I have shown that 
Poincaré does not commit to either of these claims. He takes the aim of science 
to be not truth but understanding of how the phenomena relate. He takes our 
aesthetic judgements to be regulative ideals that we follow in our enquiries, and 
not principles that allow us to claim an aesthetically pleasing theory to be 
approximately true. The use of aesthetic considerations like simplicity and unity 
is justified because they are linked to the ultimate goal of science, to understand 
the relations among phenomena.  
Contrary to the realist, Poincaré takes aesthetic properties of theories to 
be projected upon the theories by us. He nevertheless implies, in a very Kantian 
manner, that there is rationality in our aesthetic judgements due to there being 
intersubjective agreement. These Kantian elements of Poincaré’s philosophy of 
science make his position even more intriguing than previously appreciated, 
making it difficult to situate him within the contemporary positions in the 
scientific realism debate. He departs significantly from the instrumentalist and 
realist views when it comes to the aim of science, and from the objectivist and 
projectivist views, when it comes to the nature of aesthetic judgement. These 																																																								
14 An exception is Massimi (2011) who develops an internalist neo-Kantian form of 
structural realism. Massimi claims that unobservable entities, and mathematical 
structures evolve together in relation to empirical evidence. Our best scientific theories 
do not represent a mind-independent reality (unobservable entities that exist 
independently of us). On the contrary, the unobservable entities, the mathematical 
structures evolve with the development of scientific knowledge. Massimi’s position can 
be seen as a much more helpful way of thinking about Poincaré’s own position in the 
scientific realism debate.  
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arguments open a new chapter for furthering our understanding of Poincaré’s 




In this paper I have offered a new exploration of Poincaré’s aesthetics of 
science. I have argued that Poincaré takes aesthetic judgments to be central to 
scientific practice and our exploration of the world. I have investigated the 
relationship between simplicity and unity, which Poincaré considers as the 
ultimate aesthetic properties of theories. Poincaré takes simplicity and unity to 
be related to the ultimate aim of science: achieving understanding. He attributes 
to simplicity and unity a regulative role linked to the aim of science. For 
Poincaré beauty is indicative of understanding rather than truthlikeness. 
Moreover, Poincaré’s account does not easily fall between the projectivist or 
objectivist views in aesthetics and also departs from a strictly realist position. 
These elements of Poincaré’s theory of aesthetics open a new chapter into the 
study of Poincaré’s complex views on the aim of science, aesthetic judgement 
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